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1. Introduction 
International human rights have been part of international law since the 
1950s. Today, they bind more than 80 per cent of the world's states qua 
treaty law1 and, although this is more controversial, all or most of them 
qua customary international law and general principles of international 
law.2 Having been an important part of international law for the past fifty 
years, human rights have become an object of interest for political and legal 
theorists alike. Not only have they become the lingua franca of most recent 
accounts of international relations (Raz 201 0; Tasioulas 2002 ), but they are. 
often put forward as the ground for the legitimate authority of international 
law and institutions (Buchanan 2004, 2008; Goodin 2007) and, as a result, 
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and at the Authority, Coercion and Paternalism Conference in Graz on 27 and 28 May 2011. 
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index.htm. 
2 On the sources of international human rights law, see the two seminal pieces by J. F. Flauss 
(1998) and Simma & Alston (1989). 
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for that of individual states' legal orders (from an international perspective 
(Beitz 2009; Buchanan 2004; Raz 2010), but also arguably from a domes-
tic one (F0llesdal2007; Forst 2010)) and even of regional organizations' 
legal orders (e.g. the European Union's3). Surprisingly, however, very little 
attention has been given so far to the legitimacy of international human 
rights law itself (Benhabib 2008, 2009; Besson 201la, 2011e; Buchanan 
2010a; Cohen 2008; Donoho 2003; Hessler 2005). 
At a basic level, the question of the legitimacy of international human 
rights, and more precisely its legitimate or justified authority as I will 
understand it here,4 can be elucidated along the lines of the legitimacy 
of international law. The legitimacy of international law amounts to the 
imposition of moral duties of obedience on its subjects, i.e. categorical and 
exclusionary moral reasons for action (Raz 1986: 23). Those moral duties 
are duties to obey international law not because it is just, morally correct 
and justified, but qua law. They are moral duties, however, and are distinct 
therefore from the legal duties to obey the law because it is law (Raz 1995: 
342-343). Furthermore, the existence of international law's legitimacy is 
the result of an objective evaluation: international law may have legitim-
ate authority whether or not its subjects think it does and whether or not 
they have consented to its authority. In other words, it is not the perceived 
or sociological legitimacy of international human rights law this chapter 
is concerned about, but its normative legitimacy (Raz 2006: 1006-1007).5 
While the former can be established from the striving international human 
rights discourse (Galt, Koch & Bruch 2011), the latter needs to be argued 
for in other ways. 
Of course, in recent years, the various prudential or non -prudential, and 
self-regarding or cosmopolitan reasons states may have to ratify and then 
to comply with international human rights instruments have been at the 
centre of many sociological and political empirical studies (Hafner-Burton 
& Tsutsui 2005; Moravcsik 2000; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999; Simmons 
2009). Some of those reasons have also been assessed and discussed from 
a philosophical or jurisprudential perspective (Buchanan & Powell 2008: 
3 See e.g. European Court of Justice, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, 
judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 3 September 2008, European Court Reports 
2008 Page I-06351; German Bundesverfassungsgericht, Beschluss vom 30. Juni 2009, 
Lissabonsvertrag, 2 BvE 2/08. 
4 In what follows, I will use 'authority' to mean legitimate authority (see also Besson 2009a). 
For the same use of the term, see Raz (1986, 1995, 2006). 
5 See also Buchanan (2004). See, however, Franck (1988); Franck (2006: 88,91 and 93) who 
conflates the sociological and normative approaches to legitimacy. 
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330 ff.; Gardbaum 2008). The various reasons there may be to ratify and/ 
or to comply with international human rights norms ought not, however, 
to be confused with content-independent moral reasons to obey those 
norms qua legal norms.6 There may be moral reasons to create and sup-
port international human rights guarantees and institutions because they 
are morallyvaluable7 or just (Rawls 1971: 114-117 and 333-337; Waldron 
1993: 3) independently from human rights law's legitimacy. They ought 
not be confused, as a result, with moral reasons to obey the legal human 
rights applied or generated by those states and international institutions. 8 
Recently, some authors have started looking more closely at the ques-
tion of the legitimacy of international human rights institutions and their 
decisions.9 The question of those institutions' legitimacy, however fas-
cinating, is distinct from that of international human rights law itself.10 
True, international law's authority is the authority of international legal 
norms, but also accordingly of their law-making and legal interpretation 
processes and hence in part a product of the legitimacy of the domestic 
or international institutions involved in those ,processes. 11 One cannot 
indeed distinguish a legal norm from its interpretation. In the context of 
international human rights law, there are reasons, however, to address the 
two issues separately, or at least to address the legitimacy of human rights 
norms generated by states before that of international human rights insti-
tutions, on the one hand, and of their decisions and interpretations in the 
context of international human rights, on the other. 
On the one hand, it is true that international human rights institutions · 
can make or contribute to making international human rights law by inter-
preting and hence specifying international human rights further and issu-
ing application decisions. They are not usually involved in making those 
norms in the first place, however, or at least not independently from states 
themselves. Furthermore, some international human rights instruments 
6 See, for example Raz (1986: 66 ff.; 1995; 2006), on the distinction. 
7 See on those different justifications, e.g. Buchanan (2008) and Buchanan & Powell (2008). 
8 See, for example Raz (1986: 66 ff.; 1995; 2006), on the distinction. See also Buchanan 
(2008). 
9 This has been the case especially for international judicial human rights institutions and 
decisions: see e.g. Besson (2011b); F0llesdal (2007, 2008); Hessler (2005); Letsas (2008). 
10 The article focuses on legal authority in contrast to private authority, but also to political 
authority in general. On the distinction, see Raz (1979; 1986: 23, 38 and 70; 1995: 210, 341 
and 355; 2003; 2006:1004-1005). " 
11 See Besson (2009a); Buchanan (2008). Of course, the correlation is not perfect: illegit-
imate institutions may produce legitimate laws, and legitimate institutions may produce 
illegitimate laws. 
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do not have international bodies connected to them or, on the contrary, 
have many of them without clear division oflabour: some specialized and· 
some general; of many different kinds: some judicial, some quasi-judicial 
and others political; and implying di~erent subjects: states, but also indi-
viduals. As to those institutions' decisions, on the other hand, they are quite 
rarely binding and almost never self-executing. Even when they ar~, their 
alleged contribution to the 1interpretation of international human rights 
norms (their so-called jurisprudential authority or erga omnes effect) is 
deeply contested and rarely recognized by states. This is because inter-
national human rights norms are to be interpreted and applied in priority 
(or, in some cases, only) by states in their domestic legal orders and with 
the help of all their national institutions, and only in a subsidiary fash-
ion (and never completely anyway) by international human rights bodies 
(Besson 2012a; contra: Letsas 2010). Thus, while the legitimacy of inter-
national human rights institutions and their decisions in their vast diver-
sity raises intriguing and important questions, those questions cannot be 
addressed without first considering the legitimacy of international human 
rights law itself. The purpose of this chapter therefore is to address this first 
question only, leaving the question of international human rights institu-
tions' legitimacy per se and in relation to domestic institutions for another 
time. · 
So far, very few studies have focused on the justified authority of inter-
national human rights law qua law. Presumably, however, the contribution 
of international human rights norms to the legitimation of other national 
and international legal norms will depend in part or entirely on their legit-
imacy. Taken on their own, further~ore, ascertaining the existence and 
the scope of their justified authority over states is important. The existence 
of an entirely illegitimate, albeit valuable for different reasons (Tasioulas 
2010a), set of human rights norms would not be sustainable in the long 
run. The law's distinctive contribution to the advancement of valuable 
goals lies precisely in successfully laying down authoritative directives 
to reach those goals (Tasioulas 2010a). Furthermore, the fact that valid 
human rights law necessarily claims to be legitimate implies that it should 
be capable of being legitimate and hence be produced so that it can be. In 
those conditions, ensuring the legitimacy of international human rights 
law has a key influence on the organization of international human rights 
law-making and decision-making processes. This will prove particularly 
important when addressing potential conflicts between international 
human rights norms and/ or their interpretations by international human 
rights bodies with national human rights law (Hessler 2005). Finally, due 
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to the increasingly direct impact of international human rights norms on 
individuals and public authorities in areas previously exclusively covered 
by domestic human rights law (Gardbaum 2008; Stone Sweet & Keller 
2008), a legitimacy gap is gradually widening and the legitimacy of inter-
national law in those areas has become more pressing (Kumm 2004). This 
is particularly obvious when international human rights constitute dir-
ect limitations on democratically legitimate decisions and legislation at 
domestic level. 
The neglect of those issues is even more surprising as discussions of 
the legitimacy of international law in general have become more com-
mon in recent years (Besson 2009a; Bodansky 2008; Charlesworth & 
Coicaud 20 10; Franck 1988, 2006; Goldsmith & Posner 2005; Kumm 2004; 
Tasioulas 2010a; Teson 2005; Wolfrum 2007). Curiously, however, the 
legitimacy of international human rights is barely ever mentioned in that 
context or only to stress that it is precisely not in contention. 12 Indeed, 
the more robust and the more intrusive supranational human rights law 
becomes in the domestic sphere, the more effective (Helfer & Slaughter 
1997), but also, interestingly, the more legitimate it is perceived to be 
(Bayefsky 2001). Their subjective or sociological legitimacy would there-
fore seem to be in greater tension with their objective or normative legit--
imacy than is the case for other international legal norms. Furthermore, . 
the more other international institutions and legal norms are in need of 
legitimacy, the more those justifications are sought after, by analogy with 
what applies domestically, within international human rights law whose · 
legitimacy itself cannot as a result be in contention (Buchanan 2004: 189; 
Buchanan 2008; Goodin 2007). 
A first kind of explanation for this neglect or at least for this presump-
tion of legitimacy resides precisely in the prima facie counterintuitive 
nature of the question in the domestic context. Among domestic legal 
norms, human rights norms are those whose legitimate,authority is usu-
ally the least likely to be doubted; This is, primarily, because the direct 
bearers of the duty to obey human rights are public authorities and not 
individuals, and, second, because human rights norms create rights to 
the benefit of all individuals and corresponding rights-based duties for 
all public authorities. Finally, the special authority of domestic human 
rights usually stems from their constitutional nature, and hence from the 
highly inclusive and democratic adoption procedures of constitutional 
12 See e.g. Gardbaum (2008: 768). On the unquestionability of human rights, see O'Neill 
(2005: 439). ' 
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norms due to their constraining role on ordinary democratic proce-
dures. Democracy and human rights are indeed often regarded as being 
grounded by reference to the same value: political equality, and work as 
necessary mutual constraints when protecting that value.13 Human rights 
are deemed as necessary for the democratic process and as having to be 
protected from it, albeit in a way that is democratic. As a result, hllJ1lan 
rights and democracy are commonly regarded as mutually reinforcing 
at domestic level and their interdependence turns human rights into 
an inherent part of the democratic legitimation from which they have 
to benefit. It follows that their democratic credentials and accordingly 
their legitimacy are bound to be different from that of other domestic 
law norms. 
While th~ two former characteristics may be true ofinternational human 
rights as well, the legitimacy of international law pertains mainly to states' 
duties to abide by international law. Thus, the fact that the duty-bearer 
in both cases is a state cannot explain the lack of concern for the legitim-
acy of human rights at the international level. As to the third explanation, 
it cannot simply be transposed onto international human rights without 
further argument. Of course, some authors may argue that international 
human rights actually contribute not only to the democratic legitimation 
of international law, but also to the democratic legitimation of states and 
that as a result trying to assess their democratic legitimacy, even from an 
international perspective, is not feasible (Buchanan 2004: 189). It remains, 
however, that international human rights have not been deliberated and 
adopted by highly inclusive international democratic procedures the 
way constitutional rights have; they are deliberated and adopted by both 
democratic and non-democratic states, and through procedures that are 
not necessarily inclusive, egalitarian and transparent (Donoho 2003: 27 ff.; 
Gould 2004). Not to mention the lack of correspondence between those 
adopting international human rights and those actually bound by them 
and whose political equality is protected. Even if they are approved demo-
cratically at domestic level before being ratified at an intergovernmental 
level, they have not been deliberated over through democratic channels. 
As a result, international human rights are not usually regarded as source-
based superior constraints on such procedures whether domestic or 
13 See Christiano (2008: 130 and 260-264) on the mutual grounding of democracy and liberal 
rights in the principle of public equality. See also Brettschneider (2007: 23-26) on equality 
as one of the core values of democracy and substantive rights. 
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international.14 This explains why international human rights do not per 
se take priority over domestic constitutional law. Nor do they necessar-
ily take priority, either due to their source or to their content, over other . 
norms or regimes of international law. If they cannot be associated in a 
straightforward fashion with the legitimation of international law the way 
they are in domestic law, their legitimating role in the process cannot be 
held against trying to account for their own legitimacy through that pro-
cess. While it would be wrong to reduce human rights to democracy and 
prioritize the latter over the former, the contrary would be equally wrong 
and oblivious of their mutually supportive albeit complex relationship.15 
A second explanation for this differentiated take on international 
human rights may be that they stem from international agreements 
between democratic states. And indirect democratic consent through the 
consent of democratic states is usually put forward as a major justification 
for international law's authority. This explanation fails to persuade, how-
ever. Consent is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition oflegitimacy 
per se (Besson 2009a; Buchanan 2004). This applies both at the domestic 
and the international levels. Of course, as we will see, state consent still has. 
an important role to play in the ascertaining and strengthening of inter-
nationallegal authority, but it is not in and of itself a justification for obliga~ 
tions to obey the law. Nor is it correct to identify democratic consent with 
democratic legitimacy (Besson 2005a, 2009a; Hershovitz 2003). Again, in 
the absence of international democracy, consent may play an identification 
role in the generation of state duties in a fair association model (Christiano 
2012), but this should not be mistaken for democracy itself. 
A third explanation may actually be that the adoption of international 
human rights instruments historically found part of their justification in the 
reinforcement of national democracies when democracy did not fare that 
well as a binding international principle and was replaced by human rights 
(Letsas 2008; Moravcsik 2000). On this view, if human rights are there to 
consolidate national democracy, their democratic legitimacy itself cannot 
be questioned. In a similar vein, if international human rights instruments 
were initially adopted to curb democratic violations of human rights, 
accounting for their legitimacy in democratic terms would be counterpro-
ductive. These arguments come close to the democratic precommitment 
14 This explains why some authors try to conceive international human rights as a form of 
international or domestic (thick) constitutional law (see Gardbaum 2008 for the various 
arguments). For a democratic critique of this argument, see Besson (2009b: 381-407). 
15 See for the same balanced approach to the legitimacy of international human rights: 
Benhabib (2008, 2009); Cohen (2008). 
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argument that is often used in the context of discussions of the democratic 
credentials of constitutional rights. Even if this historical explanation per-
tains, times and circumstances have changed, however; national democra-
cies have developed and consolidated, including through domestic human 
rights catalogues and judicial institutions of their own. Furthermore, 
neither democracy nor human rights alone suffice to provide full legit-
imacy to any law; as they are mutually supportive, privileging one over 
the other would amount to providing an impoverished account oflegitim-
acy. Finally, precommitment types of argument based on the protection of 
human rights (including the right to self-government) against themselves 
raises well-known difficulties in the domestic context, that are magnified 
when brought to the international level (Besson 2005b; Waldron 1999). 
A fourth explanation may be found in the moral nature of human rights 
and the widespread belief in their universal moral justification. The alleged 
straightforward relationship between universal moral rights and legal human 
rights is sometimes regarded as dispensing the latter's authority from having 
to be justified the way the authority of other legal norms would in a con-
tent-independent fashion: their uncontested moral justification and the cor-
responding moral duties suffice (e.g. Gardbaum 2008: 768). Orelse, if the 
possibility of reasonable moral disagreement is contemplated, the difficulty is 
said to lie exclusively in the lack of universal scope oflegitimate authority in 
the context of the cultural parochialism or exceptionalism debates, but not in 
the possibility of moral justification per se. While parochialism raises import-
ant questions that will be broached at the end of this chapter, the moral nature 
of international human rights is not exclusive of their legal nature and is not 
left untouched by their legalization, hence the need to account for their legit-
imacy qua legal norms. Legal specifications of moral human rights may be 
controversial and trigger important reasonable disagreements of their own. 
Moreover, the institutional recognition and the legalization of human rights 
do affect their moral counterparts (Besson 20lla) and, as I will argue, it is 
precisely there that the key to their legitimacy may be found. 
Finally, yet another explanation for the absence of discussion of the 
legitimacy of international human rights may lie in the specific nature 
of human rights qua rights and the kind of legitimate authority rights 
may claim to have. Rights are interests which are regarded as sufficiently 
important to give rise to duties. Qua entitlements and source of a nor-
mative relationship, rights correspond to correlative duties albeit with a 
justificatory priority over those duties. Legal rights are legally recognized, 
specified or created moral rights and trigger as a result both legal and moral 
duties. When moral agents are bound by a legal right, they are bound by 
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the primary moral duties corresponding to the right and by the secondary 
moral duties to obey this right qua legal norm and to abide by its corre-
sponding moral duties. Those duties are usually reduced to each other and 
go unnoticed at the domestic level. The same may be said about the right-
holders of both kinds of duties in a democracy where the group of those 
affected in their fundamental interests and the citizens overlap: they are all 
the citizens in a given polity. And this in turn may explain why the justi-
fication of the second-order duties to abide by a legal right and its duties 
is not usually regarded as an additional requirement. That does not neces-
sarily apply to the international level, however. International human rights 
can bind states as international legal norms but generate corresponding 
human rights duties for other subjects as well whether on the international 
or the domestic plane: state authorities in their domestic setting, lOs, etc. 
The same may be said about the right -holders ofboth kinds of duties: states, 
and arguably the international community as a whole for the second -order 
duty to abide by international human rights law and individuals for the 
first-order duty to respect human rights. As a result, the question of the 
legitimacy of those second-order duties can be regarded as an important · 
one and its justification as logically distinct from the justification of first-
order human rights duties, albeit intrinsically related to it. 
All five explanations provide interesting insights into the specificity 
of international human rights norms and about the ways one may justify 
their authority. It reveals, if need be, how complex the enquiry into those 
different justifications is bound to be: it requires a good understanding· . 
of difficult issues such as the nature and justification of moral and legal 
human rights, and the relationship between their moral justification and 
their legitimate authority, a good grasp oflaw's and human rights' author-
ity and a view of the relationship between human rights and democracy at . 
the domestic level, on the one hand. It also requires, however, explaining 
how one can make all three questions travel to the international level and 
back to the domestic level and how to adapt our accounts of the relation-
ship between democratic legitimacy and domestic human rights when the 
human rights and/or the democratic processes at stake are international, 
on the other. A separation between domestic and international law in the 
field of human rights would make no political and legal sense in the light 
of existing human rights practice that straddles the different sources of 
human rights16 and hence no sense in terms oflegitimacy either. 
16 On the domestic constitutionalization of international human rights in Europe, see 
Gardbaum (2008); and on the ECHR in domestic human rights reasoning in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland, see Besson (2008). 
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In order to know whether international human rights norms have a 
justified claim to legitimate authority over states, the chapter focuses on 
their normative or 'supply' side and in particular on their corresponding 
duties (O'Neill2005: 430). It starts by assessing what kind of duties and 
hence what kind of reasons states have by virtue of recognizing human 
rights. This implies determining whether those norms can be described 
as legal human rights in the first place with the respective legal and 
moral duties they imply and what is the relationship between domes-
tic and international human rights law in that context. Th.en it turns to 
the different conditions of their legitimate authority and to the issue of 
how the reasons given by international human rights law can not only 
match corresponding states' reasons, but also contribute to improving 
conformity to those reasons. It is the interdependence between human 
rights and political equality and the role of human rights for democratic 
authority at domestic level that is at the core of the argument about 
the mutual legalization and legitimation of international and domestic 
human rights. 
To that effect, the argument in this chapter is three-pronged: in the first 
section, I start by general considerations about the model of legitimate 
authority of international legal norms, before discussing the moral-legal 
nature of international human rights and the relationship between domes-
tic and international legal guarantees of human rights in the second sec-
tion (Besson 2009a, 2011c). The third step of the argument enables us to 
bring those two groups of considerations together and address the ques-
tion of the legitimate authority of international human rights law, by look-
ing at four basic issues: how states may bind themselves to create human 
rights duties for themselves, what the justification for the duty to obey 
those rights could be, whether they can consent to more than they have 
to and, finally, whether sovereignty can be invoked against the legitimate 
authority of international human rights. 
2. The legitimate authority of international law 
The model of legitimate authority of international law that is used in this 
chapter is best captured by explaining, first, the concept of legitimate 
authority of international law that is chosen and, second, the conception 
that is applied to international human rights law.17 
17 This section is borrowed and summarized from Besson (2009a). 
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2.1 The concept of legitimate authority of international law 
The first difficulty facing any explanation of the legitimacy of international 
law lies in the identification of a concept of legitimacy that can account 
for the legitimacy of (at least some part of) international law. The dif-
ferences between international and national law in that respect are well 
known (Buchanan 2008): international law is mostly the product of hori-
zontal interstate law-making practice and, to be more precise, of different 
interstate practices. Some international legal norms are more akin to mak-
ing contractual promises and others to general legal rule-making for all 
subjects of international law. As a result, international law is said to lack 
a centralized and hierarchical ensemble of law-making institutions and 
processes that may be equated with domestic law-making authorities and 
legislating procedures, on the one hand, and is mostly exempt from sanc-
tions backing up its norms, on the other. 
To make things more complex, new forms of international law have 
arisen in recent times that question the exclusivity of the horizontal inter-
state law paradigm. Subjects no longer only include states making law 
for other states, but also international organizations (lOs) and individ-
uals as subjects of rights and obligations. With respect.to its object, inter-
nationallaw no longer pertains only to interstate relations, but also, for 
instance in the case of international human rights, to intrastate relations 
and therefore directly regulates the life of individuals alongside domestic 
law. Finally, and maybe as a result, the sources of international law and its· 
law-making processes have become more diverse and have developed to 
include, besides the 'famous three' (treaties, customary law and general 
principles), general multilateral interstate law-making processes that often 
associate individual actors, and unilateral legislation by lOs: Interestingly, 
those very sources which include subjects of international law other than 
states regulate matters previously covered by domestic law only and often 
through majority rule (Besson 2009a; Kumm 2004; Wolfrum 2007). In 
terms of normativity as well, international law no longer offers a unified 
face. International legal norms can bind subjects universally or not (e.g. 
erga omnes and omnium duties) and to varying degrees (e.g. jus cogens 
norms and, more controversially, soft law) (Tasioulas 1996; Weil1983). 
Thus, either the concept of legitimacy that is chosen accounts for the 
legitimate authority of both national and international law, but in a way that 
can capture not only their differences but also the sheer diversity of inter-
national law-making itself, or two (or more) separate concepts oflegitimacy 
are used in each case. Given the increasing intermingling of international 
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and domestic legal orders and, arguably, their reciprocal legitimation 
(Buchanan 2011), but especially given the common individual subjects of 
those legal orders, auth9rs writing about the legitimacy of international law 
ought to choose and use one of the concepts of legitimate authority devel-
oped for the domestic context and apply it in a transitive manner (Besson 
2009a; Tasioulas 2010a). Of course, this does not imply that the specific 
justifications for the authority of international law or its consequences will 
be the same as those applicable to domestic law given the differences iden-
tified before between those two legal orders. The remainder of this chapter 
is actually devoted to exploring the specificities of the legitimacy in inter-
national law, and in international human rights law in particular. Rather, 
what matters for ouq:>urpose is that the concept that is used when assessing 
the legitimacy oflegal norms stemming from both orders is the same. 
Besides the virtues of conceptual unity fu a pluralist legal order, it is 
important, when choosing a· concept of legitimate authority of inter-
nationallaw, that it can also be applied to individual legal subjects and 
not only to states}8 When states are bound by obligations of international 
law, their institutions and subjects are bound indirectly and have to com-
ply with them through the actions of their state, whe!?- they are not bound 
directly. As a result, assessing the legitimacy of international law and 
national law with the same concept, but on an interstate basis in the case 
of international law and on a state-individual basis in the case of national 
law is unhelpful. The legitimacy of international law can only be under-
stood if the reasons for action it provides to all subjects of that authority 
are assessed at the same time and by reference to individual subjects as 
ultimate subjects of authority. Of course, this is not to Q.eny that inter-
national law may provide different subjects with different reasons: states 
with some reasons and individuals with others. However, because the 
relationship between those subjects is one of constituency, separating the 
justifications for those reasons or, worse, eluding some of them blinds to 
an essential connection between them. When a state is bound by an inter-
national legal norm, its institutions and subjects are bound at the same 
time, whether directly or indirectly, and this must necessarily affect in 
return the way in which the state itself can be bound (Kumm 2004: 91 0; 
Murphy 2010). 
Those two points are particularly important in the case of international 
human rights law whose content overlaps with that of domestic human 
18 See Besson (2009a). For a similar argument but in relation to the application of the .inter-
national rule oflaw to states, see Besson (2011d); Waldron (2011). 
44 SAMANTHA BESSON 
rights law and whose subjects overlap with those of domestic human rights 
law. This correspondence of content and scope is actually part of what 
international human rights are about: providing a subsidiary and minimal 
set of human rights guarantees that prevent a levelling-down in domestic 
human rights protection. Moreover, when states bind themselves through 
international human rights law, they bind the domestic polity and in turn 
contribute to mutually securing the equal status of each of its individual 
members within the polity itself. In that respect, it is very important to 
assess the legitimate authority of international human rights law for the 
state but with individual members of the domestic polity in mind. 
2.2 The conception of legitimate authority of international law 
2.2.1 Razian authority 
Joseph Raz's seminal and refined account of authority, and of legitimate 
legal authority in particular (Raz 1986, 1995, 2006), constitutes a useful 
starting point for any discussion of international law's authority (Tasioulas 
2010a). It is also the conception that constitutes the basis of the model of 
democratic authority that I propose, albeit complemented with a demo-
cratic procedural requirement. 19 
In a nutshell, the Razian conception of legal authority comprises two 
elements: A has legitimate authority over C when Xs directives are (i) con-
tent-independent and (ii) exclusionary reasons for action for C. In other 
words, the directives are authoritative reasons for action, first, by virtue of 
the fact that A issued them and not because of the content of any particular 
directive (Raz 1986: 35 ff.; 2006: 1012-1020), and, second, because these 
reasons are not simply to be weighed along with other reasons that apply 
to C but, instead, have the normative effect of excluding some counter-
vailing reasons for action (Raz 1986: 57 ff.; 2006). The authority of those 
reasons for action is justified, according to Raz, if two conditions are ful-
filled: (i) the dependence condition (DC); and (ii) the normal justification 
condition (NJC). Both conditions are intrinsically related. First, Xs dir-
ectives have to match (objective) reasons that apply to C independently of 
1\.s directives (Raz 1986: 42 ff.; 2006). Second, A has legitimate authority 
over C if the latter would better conform with those reasons that apply 
to him or her if he or she intends to be guided by 1\.s directives than if he 
or she does not (Raz 1986: 53; 2006: 1014). So, an authority is legitimate 
19 I have argued elsewhere for this complement to the Razian basic account oflegal authority: 
Besson (2005a, 2005b). 
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when its subjects would likely better conform with the reasons that apply 
to them by treating the authority's directives as content-indeeendent and 
exclusionary reasons for action than if they did not. This is what is meant 
by the so-called 'service conception' of legitimate authority: it facilitates 
its subjects' conformity with the (objective) reasons that already apply to 
them and hence respects their autonomy (Raz 2006: 1012 ff.). By auton-
omy, I mean having and exercising the capacity to choose from a range of 
options (Griffin 2008: 33). 
Among the content-independent reasons that may trigger the applica-
tion of the NJC, one usually mentions the authority's epistemic expertise, 
its cognitive, decisional or volitional ability, its executive capacity or its 
coordinative ability (Raz 1986: 75 ff.). The specific justification will vary 
depending on the circumstances and theconcrete ability of each legal norm 
or set oflegal norms, on the one hand, and the subject's own objective rea-
sons, on the other. This explains the piecemeal nature oflaw's legitimate 
authority in Raz's account, i.e. the fact that the law cannot have general 
legitimate authority over all subjects at one given time, and this realization 
is quite illuminating when the piecemeal nature of legal authority is con-
trasted with the law's general claim to authority. 
2.2.2 Revised Razian authority 
One of the major content-independent sets of reasons for action that can 
be provided by a public authority in the legal context is a salient set of 
coordinative reasons.20 When there is an independent reason to choose 
one single interpretation or course of action in circumstances of reason-
able disagreement and hence to coordinate, legal authority can help iden-
tify some of the conflicting reasons for action or orderings of reasons as 
salient and hence can help legal subjects coordinate over them. 
In fact, as I have argued elsewhere, coordination on issues of common 
concern is a much more common, requirement in the pluralist circum-
stances of contemporary politics than legal theorists are usually ready to 
concede. In conditions of pervasive and persistent reasonable di~agree­
ment about justice, the creation of a legal order as a means of general 
coordination over matters of justice is actually in itself a requirement 
of justice (Besson 2005b; Finnis 1984: 115-138; Waldron 1993; 1999: 
101-113). And the law constitutes the best coordination mechanism one 
may think of: it provides a framework through which one may identify in a 
20 See, for coordination-based accounts of legal authority founded on Razian authority, 
Besson (2005b); Waldron (2003). 
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determinate and public manner a salient solution from a range of morally 
eligible solutions. This has to do with its decisional and expressive abilities, 
but also, although not only, with the sanctions it can provide in case of 
non-conformity (Besson 2005b: 459, 503; Waldron 1999: 101-113). As a 
result, the reason to coordinate over certain issues is not restricted to cer-
tain contexts and legal areas where so-called 'coordination problems' arise, 
such as environmental law, migration law or disarmament law, but it is a 
more general reason to constitute a legal system and then to abide by the 
rules of that legal system as a whole, whether or not those rules effectively 
solve coordination problems in practice. 
The kind of coordination I have in mind here is (partial-conflict) coord-
ination over moral concerns when people disagree reasonably over them 
and therefore have an independent reason to coordinate over a common 
take on those issues if they know others will do so as well and can identify 
what all of them will coordinate over - even if this means not doing things 
the way they separately think would be the right way to go about doing 
them.21 
Scope precludes expanding here on the question oflaw and coordin-
ation, but any form of coordination over matters of common concern 
cannot be judged in the same way. Democratic coordination provides the 
most legitimate mode of coordination in circumstances of reasonable dis-
agreement over matters of justice.22 It respects equality by including all 
those affected in the decision-making process over issues of disagreement. 
Democratic legitimacy is another dimension that escapes most recent 
accounts of law's authority that are still, and questionably so, focused on a 
hierarchical divide between rulers and governed. 23 In any case, since dem-
ocracy is incremental and rarely fully realized, the proposed account of 
coordination-based authority does not exclude less or non-democratic 
forms of legitimate coordination (Raz 2006: 1031 fn. 20, 1037-1040). In 
a nutshell, democratic decision-making is intrinsically valuable because it 
respects basic political equality in circumstances of pervasive and persist-
ent reasonable disagreement about morality. More precisely, majority rule 
provides all participants with an equal chance of giving salience to their 
21 On the difference between consent and coordination, see Besson (2005b: 473-475); 
Waldron (1993: 25-27). Consent can enhance coordination, but is not necessary for coord-
ination to take place. 
22 See Besson (2005b: 459 ff.); Waldron (1999: 101-113) on democratic coordinative author-
ity. See for a non-coordination-based account of democratic authority that is very similar, 
Christiano (2008: 231-259). 
23 See, for example Hershovitz's (2003: 209-210) critique ofRaz's account oflegal authority. 
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own views over what ought to be done over matters of common concern 
and thus by taking turns in the decision-making process.24 
If all this pertains, (democratic) coordination provides one of the main 
justifications for the law's authority. It is a justification that may actually 
overlap with some of the others mentioned above, including epistemic 
expertise and executive orvolitive ability in certain cases (Raz 2006: 1031), 
but it also applies much more broadly than most. This has consequences 
for the piecemeal approach to legal authority presented before - although 
law's legitimate authority is not necessarily as general as the law claims 
it is, its scope can be much broader than conceded by proponents of the 
Razian account. This does not mean, however, that other justifications of 
authority cannot apply on an individual basis and complement the demo-
cratic coordination-based legitimacy of the law.25 Nor does it prevent 
the coordination-based account from coexisting with other reasons for 
respect and recognition of law's authority that usually fill the gap between 
the law's general claim to legitimate authority and the piecemeal scope of 
its objective legitimacy. 
Importantly, the coordination-based approach to authority just pre-
sented ought not be understood as an alternative to the Razian account 
described before, but, on the contrary, as a re-interpretation of that 
account in circumstances of ordinary law-making, and public authority 
(Besson 2005a: 89; 2005b: 490-498).26 This re-interpretation requires spe-
cifying the concept of justified authority and its conditions, in order to 
accommodate the way the law provides a whole class of subjects, and not 
each of them separately, and a class of subjects who are also authors of the 
law they are subjected to, rather than dominated by the law and its authors, 
with reasons for coordinated action over matters of justice and common 
concern. , 
Thanks to its minimal and flexible features, the revised democratic 
coordination-based account of Raz's service conception of authority pro-
vides the perfect account of the legitimacy of international law and of 
international human rights law in p~rticular. It is piecemeal and does not 
24 In contrast to what is often said (see, for example, Tasioulas 201 Oa) and presumably derived 
from a skewed idea of participatory practices in a democracy, individual consent ought not 
therefore be conflated with democracy as a justification of authority. See Hershovitz (2003: 
215). 
25 See Waldron (2003: 66) on the contrast between purely individual and coordination-based 
individual reasons to obey the directives of a public authority. 
26 See Besson (2005a: 89; 2005b: 490-498); Waldron (2003). See also the replies by Raz (2003; 
2006: 1040-1044). 
SAMANTHA BESSON 
understand the legitimate authority oflaw to be general and applicable to 
all subjects in a similar fashion, on the one hand, and it encompasses many 
different justifications that can fit different social and cultural contexts, on 
the other. Those two features fit the many authors, subjects and sources 
of international human rights law. The proposed conception of legitim-
acy corresponds, in other words, to the fragmented and non-monolithical . 
nature of international human rights law. 
3. The nature ofhuman rights 
The notion of human rights that is used in this chapter is best captured 
by explaining, first, the moral nature of human rights and, second, what 
lies in their legalization and how legal human rights relate to the universal 
moral rights they recognize, modulate or create. 27 
3.1 Moral human rights 
In a nutshell, human rights may be considered a subset of universal moral 
rights (i) that protect fundamental and general human interests (ii) against 
the intervention, or in some cases non-intervention of (national, regional 
or international) political institutions (iii). Those three elements will be 
presented in turn. 
To start with, a human right exists qua moral right when an interest 
is a sufficient ground or reason to hold someone else (the duty-bearer) 
under a (categorical and exclusionary) duty to respect that interest vis-
a-vis the right-holder (Raz 1984b: 195). For a right to be recognized, a 
sufficient interest must be established in a particular social context (Raz 
1984b: 200, 209). Rights are, on this conception, intermediaries between 
interests and duties (Raz 1984b: 208). It follows, first of all, that a right may 
be recognized and protected before specifying which duties correspond to 
it (MacCormick 1977: 201). Once a duty is specified, it will be correlative 
to the (specific) right, but the right may pre-exist abstractly without its 
specific duties being identified. The relationship between rights and par-
ticular duties is justificatory therefore, and not logical (MacCormick 1977: 
199-202; Raz 1984b: 196, 200). As a result, the determination of the duty-
bearer( s) of a right and its claimability are not conditions of the existence 
of a moral right (Tasioulas 2007). A right is, second, a sufficient ground 
for holding other individuals under all the duties necessary to protect the 
27 This section is borrowed and summarized from Besson (2011c). 
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interest rather than in terms of the details of these duties (Waldron 1984: 
10-11). It follows that a right might provide for the imposition of many 
duties and not only one. Rights actually have a dynamic nature and, as 
such, successive specific duties can be grounded on a given right depend-
ing on the circumstances (Raz 1984b: 197-199). This application indeter-
minacy of rights also implies that rights need to be localized to be fully 
effective; it is only in local circumstances that the allocation and specifica-
tion of duties can take place (Buchanan 2004: 180-186). 
Turning to the second element in the definition, human rights are moral 
rights of a special intensity and universal moral rights, in that the inter-
ests protected are regarded as fundamental and general interests that all 
human beings have by virtue of their existence and not of a given status or 
circumstance. They include individual interests when these constitute part 
of a person's well-being in an objective sense. That person need not believe 
that it is the case for her interest to require protection as a human right. 
What makes it the case that a given individual interest is regarded as 
sufficiently fundamental or important to generate a duty and that, in other 
words, the threshold of importance and point of passage from a general 
and fundamental interest to a human right is reached, may be found in 
the normative status of each individual qua equal member of the moral-
political community, i.e. their political equality or equal political status. 28 
A person's interests are owed equal respect in virtue ofher status as mem-
ber of the community and of her relations to other members in the com-
munity; those interests are recognized as socio-coinparatively important 
by members of the community and only then can they be recognized as 
human rights (Besson 2012b, 2013a; Buchanan 2005, 2010b). The recog-
nition of human rights is done mutually and not .simply vertically, and as 
a result human rights are not externally promulgated as such but mutually 
granted by members of a given political community (Cohen 2004: 197-
198; Forst 2010). Of course, human rights are not merely a consequence of 
individuals' equal status, but also a way of actually earning that equal sta-
tus and consolidating it. Without human rights, political equality would 
remain an abstract guarantee; through human rights, individuals become 
actors of their own equality and members of their political community 
(Cohen 2004; 2008: 585-596). Human rights are power-mediators, in 
other words:29 they enable political equality. Borrowing Hannah Arendt's 
28 See Forst ( 1999: 48; 2010 ). On the relationship between. political equality and human rights 
more generally, see e.g. Christiano (2008: 138, 156). 
29 For the original idea of mediating duties, see Shue (1988: 703). See also Reus-Smit (2009). 
On liberal rights and the exercise of power in general, see Christiano (2008: 134). 
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words: 'we are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on 
the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights' 
(Arendt 1951). 
In short, the proposed account of the nature of human rights follows 
a modified interest-based theory: it is modified or complemented by ref-
erence to considerations of equal moral-political status in a given com-
munity.30 Thus, this relationship between human rights and political 
equality bridges the sterile opposition between the individual and the 
groupY Under a purely status-based or a purely interest-based model, the 
Manichean opposition between the individual and the group, and between 
his private and public autonomy would lead to unjustifiable conclusions 
that are tempered in the proposed account (Tasioulas 2010b). 
It is important to pause at this stage and clarify what is meant by pol-
itical equality or inclusion into an organized political society.32 Political 
equality is a normative idea according to which a person's interests are to 
be treated equally and taken into consideration in a given political group's 
decision. Human rights protect those interests tied to equal political mem-
bership and whose disrespect would be tantamount to treating them as 
outsiders. Of course, some human rights, such as civic and political rights, 
are more closely tied to actual political membership, while others such as 
the right to life, for instance, are closer to basic demands of humanity and 
hence to access to political membership. Even the latter rights, however, 
constrain what equal membership can mean if it is to be legitimate and 
the kind of interests it must protect. By submitting individuals to geno-
cide, torture and other extreme forms of cruel treatment, a community 
excludes them and no longer treats them as equal members, thus violating 
the threshold of recognition of human rights: political equality. This is in 
line with the republican idea of the political community qua locus of rights 
(Cohen 2008:604 fn. 47). 
This idea of equal political status or membership may also be referred 
to as democratic membership, as will be the case in the remainder of the 
present article. Democracy is indeed morally required by the commitment 
to the equal political status of persons. And one may even add that, just 
30 Scope precludes discussing the notion of political equality to a full extent here. It suffices to 
say I am using it to refer to equal political status as opposed to distributive equality, and as a 
minimalist requirement of transnational justice. On the importance of equal status, see e.g. 
Anderson (1999); Waldron (2002). See also Besson (2013a). 
31 The proposed account comes very dose to, but is distinct from Forst (1999: 48-50; 2007; 
2010). 
32 The following argument is a specific development of Cohen (2004: 197-198 )'s argument. 
THE LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY OF IHR 51 
as human rights, democracy enlivens and enables political equality. Their 
common grounding by reference to political equality actually confirms the 
mutual relationship between human rights and democra~y. Of course, just 
as human rights, democracy implies more than political equality. Scope 
precludes discussing it extensively, but democracy qua political regime 
also implies egalitarian deliberation and decision-making procedures. 
This brings me to the third element in the definition of human rights: 
human rights are entitlements we all have equally against each other, and 
hence against our public institutions (national, regional or international). 
They generate duties on the part of public authorities not only to protect 
equal individual interests, but also individuals' political status qua equal 
political actors. Public institutions are necessary for collective endeavour 
and political self-determination, but may also endanger them. Human 
rights enable the functioning of those institutions in exchange for political 
equality and protection from abuse of political power. This is why one can 
say that human rights both are protected by public institutions and pro-
vide protection against them; they exist because of collective endeavour 
in order both to favour and constrain it. Of course, other individuals may 
individually violate the interests protected by human rights and ought to be 
prevented from doing so by public institutions and in particular through 
legal means. This ought to be the case whether those individuals' actions 
and omissions may be attributed to public authorities or not qua de jure or 
de facto organs. However, public institutions remain the primary address-
ees of human rights claims and hence their primary duty-bearers. 
3.2 Legal human rights 
It follows from the moral-political nature of human rights that the law is 
an important dimension of their recognition and existence. It is time to 
understand exactly how this is the case and to unpack the inherently legal 
dimension of human rights. 
Just as moral rights are moral propositions and sources of moral duties, 
legal rights are legal propositions and sources of legal duties. They are 
moral interests recognized by the law as sufficiently important to generate 
moral duties (Raz 1984a: 12; 2010). The same may be said oflegal human 
rights: legal human rights are fundamental and general moral interests 
recognized by the law as sufficiently important to generate moral duties. 
Generally speaking, moral rights can exist independently from legal 
rights, but legal rights recognize, modify or create moral rights by recog-
nizing moral interests as sufficiently important to generate moral duties. 
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Of course, there may be ways of protecting moral interests or even inde-
pendent moral rights legally without recognizing them as legal 'rights: 
Conversely, some legal rights may not actually protect pre-existing moral 
rights or create moral rights, thus only bearing the name of 'rights' and 
generating legal duties at the most. The same cannot be said of human 
rights more specifically, however. 
First of all, it is true that not all universal moral rights have been or are 
legally recognized as legal human rights. Some are even expressly recog-
nized as universal moral rights by the law even though they are not made 
into legal rights or modulated by the law. A distinct question is whether 
they ought to be legalized and hence protected by law. Again, respect for 
universal moral rights ought to be voluntary in priority, and this independ-
ently from any institutional involvement. However, the universal moral 
rights that will become human rights create moral duties for institutions, 
and hence for the law as well, to recognize and protect human rights (Raz 
2010). Based on the moral-political account of human rights presented 
previously, the law provides the best and maybe the only way of mutu-
ally recognizing the socio-comparative importance of those interests in a 
political community of equals. 33 It enables the weighing of those interests 
against each other and the drawing of the political equality threshold or 
comparative line. 
In short, the law makes them human rights. As a result, in the moral-
political account of human rights propounded here, the legal recognition 
of a fundamental human interest, in conditions of political equality, is part 
of the creation of a moral-political human right. In other words, while 
being independently justified morally and having a universal and general 
scope, human rights qua subset of universal moral rights are also of an 
inherently legal nature. To quote Jii.rgen Habermas, 'they are conceptu-
ally oriented towards positive enactment by legislative bodies' (Habermas 
1998a: 183; 1998b: 310-312). Thus, while legal rights stricto sensu are 
necessarily moral in nature (qua rights), human rights (qua rights) are also 
necessarily legal and they are as a result both moral and legal rights. 
Second, legal human rights necessarily also pre-exist as independent 
universal moral rights. However, the law can specify and weigh moral 
human interests further when recognizing them as legal human rights. 
33 Cohen (2008: 599-600); Forst (1999, 2010); see even Pogge (2005: 3 fn. 26) who concedes 
this point in the case of civil and political rights. It seems, however, that the egalitarian di-
mension ofhuman rights and hence their inherently legal nature would apply even more to 
the case of social and economic rights. 
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One may imagine certain political interests whose moral-political signifi-
cance may stem from the very moral-political circumstances oflife in a 
polity. As a result, the law does not create universal moral rights, but it 
can modulate them when recognizing them. The inherently legal nature of 
human rights and the role the law plays in recognizing given interests as 
sufficiently important in a group as to generate duties and hence human 
rights make it the case that the law turns pre-existing universal moral 
rights into human rights and hence actually makes them human rights. As 
a result, human rights cannot pre-exist their legalization as independent 
moral human rights, but only as independent universal moral rights. 
The next question pertains to the locus oflegalization ofhuman rights, i.e. 
the legal recognition and modulation of universal moral rights qua human 
rights. It could per se take place at the domestic or at the international 
level: through national or international law. The locus of legalization of 
human rights ought to be domestic in priority, however. International 
human rights provide an external and minimal entrenchment for human 
rights legalized and hence recognized domestically. 
Given what was said about the interdependence between human rights 
and political equality, indeed, the political process through which their 
legalization takes place ought to be democratic and include all those whose 
rights are affected. As a result, using international law to recognize funda-
mental and general human interests as sufficiently important to generate 
state duties at the domestic level is delicate. Not only does international 
law-making include many other states and subjects than those affected, 
but the democratic quality of its processes is not secured, at least not yet 
(Christiano 20 10; Cohen 2008: 599-600). Unless internationallegalhuman 
rights refer to and correspond to existing domestic (moral-political and 
legal) human rights, therefore, they cannot be regarded as human rights 
for lack of a moral-political community. What this means is that so-called 
international human rights can at least be regarded as legally protected 
universal moral rights and most of the time as legal rights as well. One of 
those universal moral rights is the universal moral right to have rights, i.e. 
the right to equal membership in a moral-political community. According 
to Arendt, the 'right to have rights' is a right to political membership and 
includes the right to have all other human rights that make individuals 
equal members of the moral-political community (Arendt 1951; Cohen 
2008: 604 fn. 47; Forst 2010). That right would prohibit submitting indi-
viduals to genocide, torture and other extreme forms of cruel treatment, 
through which a community would exclude individuals and not treat them 
as equal members (Cohen 2008: 587). 
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Qua legal rights, international human rights norms guarantee rights to 
individuals under a given state's jurisdiction, on the one hand, and to other 
states (or arguably lOs) (international human rights are usually guaran-
teed erga omnes), on the other, to have those rights guaranteed as 'human 
rights' within a given domestic community. They correspond to states' 
(and/or arguably lOs') duties to secure and ensure respect for those rights 
as 'human rights' within their own jurisdiction. In that sense, international 
human rights law's duties are international legal second-order duties for 
states (and/ or arguably lOs) to generate first -order human rights duties for 
themselves under domestic law, i.e. international duties to have domestic 
duties. 
Interestingly, the normative considerations presented before about 
the locus of legitimation and hence of legalization of human rights are 
reflected in contemporary processes of legalization of human rights 
under domestic and international law. They fit and justify, in other 
words, our current international human rights practice. To start with, 
one observes that human rights guarantees in international law are 
usually minimal. They rely on national guarantees and their common 
denominator (often referred to as 'consensus') to formulate a min-
imal threshold which they reflect and entrench internationally (Besson 
2012a). More importantly, they are usually abstract and meant to be 
fleshed out at domestic level, not only in terms of the specific duties 
attached to a given right but also in terms of the right itself. Although 
they share the same content and scope, both levels of protection are 
usually regarded as complementary and as serving different functions, 
therefore, rather than as providing competing guarantees. This comple-
mentarity between international and domestic guarantees explains why 
the national reception of international human rights within domestic 
law is favoured or even required by international human rights instru-
ments. Domestic human rights law does more than merely implement 
international human rights therefore: it contextualizes and specifies 
them. One actually often talks of 'reception' within the domestic legal 
order in that respect (Stone Sweet & Keller 2008). Through domestic 
legal reception, national authorities determine democratically what the 
actual threshold of importance of various human interests is to be and. 
what duties that human right will give rise to in practice. Gradually, as 
domestic human rights are fleshed out in similar fashions across the 
board, the minimal human rights consensus among states is becoming 
thicker and can feed back into international human rights law that will 
constrain domestic authorities in return. 
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Besides its explanatory force faced with current human rights practice, 
this approach to international human rights has the further benefit of fit-
ting the structure of the international legal order more generally. It puts 
international human rights law back into its political context. State sover-
eignty and political self-determination constitute indeed one of the pillars 
of the international order, a pillar which is complemented and not replaced 
or, strictly speaking, even restricted by the second pillar of international 
human rights law.34 Through those two pillars and its dualistic structure, 
the international legal order protects the very interdependence between 
democracy and human rights alluded to before and hence keeps the ten-
sion between the individual and the group at the core of international law-
making. International law guarantees the basic conditions for political 
equality and self-determination by protecting peoples through state sov-
ereignty, on the one hand, and by protecting individuals through human 
rights, on the other. 
4. The legitimate authority of international human rights 
Among the various key questions usually addressed in any autonomy-
based account of legal authority, there are four main features that deserve 
particular attention in the international context. Those four questions per-
tain to: whose autonomy it is we are concerned about; how that autonomy 
can be said to be enhanced by authority; how consent relates to the best 
exercise of one's autonomy; and, finally, whether autonomy can sometimes 
be said to be best protected on its own. In international terms, the ques-
tions pertain to:cthe identity of the subjects of authority in international 
law and in particular the relationship between states and individuals; the 
justification of the authority vested in international horizontal law-mak-
ing processes and in particular the democratic coordination justification; 
the role of additional reasons for respect for tpe law one encounters in 
international law and in particular the role of state consent; and, finally, 
the compatibility between the service conception of authority and state 
sovereignty. 
4.1 The subjects: double-binding 
One of the first difficulties facing an account of the authority of inter-
national human rights lies in the identification of its subjects, i.e. the 
34 See for a similar argument, Cohen (2008: 595-597); Macklem (2007: 577). 
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determination of those subjects in authority and of those submitted to 
their authority. 
In the domestic context, the subjects of authority are usually taken to 
be the law and, more exactly, a centralized set of state institutions, on 
one side, and individuals or groups of individuals, on the other. Given 
the prevalence of the vertical model of political authority, the (state) 
institutions v. individuals model of authority is usually transposed with-
out further thought in the legal context. While it matches the reality of 
legislative politics, the model has been criticized, however, for personi-
fying law-making authority (Raz 1986: 70). It also obfuscates the identity 
between law-makers and legal subjects in a democratic legal order,3s on 
the one hand, and eludes the coordinative relationship between law-mak-' 
ing institutions, 36 on the other. The former inability to explain democratic 
authority is particularly problematic when accounting for the legitimate 
authority of human rights given the identity between right-holders and 
duty-bearers in a democracy. 
In the international context, the vertical model has become an even 
more important source of confusion. To start with, there is no centralized 
and hierarchical law-making process, but many processes and without a 
hierarchical order between them, ranging from treaty-making and cus-
tomary law-making to unilateral law-making by lOs (Boyle & Chinkin 
2007; Lowe 2000). 
Second, the law-makers are manifold and are implicated to different 
extents in those different processes; they range from states and lOs to 
individuals (Alvarez 2006; McCorquodale 2004). The same applies to the 
subjects of those laws, which are diverse; they range from natural persons 
to collective entities like states and lOs. Third, contrary to what applies 
at the domestic level, not all subjects of international law are direct sub-
jects of authority, i.e. subjects to (legitimate) duties to obey international 
law; some are merely subjects of rights, while others may be subjects to 
duties to obey, but without the means to claim their rights and duties at the 
international level. This is the case, according to traditional approaches, of 
individuals in international law. Finally, at least in traditional international 
law-making processes such as treaties or customary law, given the over-
lap between states qua law-makers and states qua legal subjects, there is 
prima facie no clear separation between law-makers and legal subjects. 
35 See e.g. Hershovitz (2003). See, however, Raz (2006: 1031-1032). 
36 See e.g. Waldron (2003). See, however, Raz (2006). 
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As a result, the relationship seems horizontal as opposed to the vertical 
domestic relation of authoritative law-making. 
This is why I have argued elsewhere that it is essential we lift the state veil 
to understand the scope of the authority of international law. 37 A state may 
or may not be conceived as an entity 'over and above' the people who con-
stitute it, but if states can act, and be held in duty, this is only because there 
are people involved. This is true even if legal doctrine, in treating corpor-
ate entities such as states as legal persons, neglects the relationship those 
entities have to people. The potential moral effect of the law on people is 
in need of justification. This does not mean that all legitimate authority of 
international law is, in the end, authority over individuals. It means that 
practices of ascribing duties to collectives of people like states must make 
moral sense and this means that the moral position of individuals cannot 
be ignored. 38 
In what follows, the relationship between international law-makers and 
international legal subjects is addressed in more detail. Of course, the coor-
dination-based justification of authority defended here relies on a demo-
cratic model oflaw-making where legal subjects participate in a collective 
law-making exercise or, at least, where institutions (states or lOs) are both 
officials and proxies for legal subjects in that exercise. This is particularly 
important in the human rights context where states are bound towards 
other states in the international community to respect their human rights 
duties towards individuals: in short, they acquire an interstate duty to gen-
erate and then conform to a state-individual duty and are double-binding 
themselves as it were. More precisely, states' primary or first -order human 
rights duties are duties they owe to individual right-bearers within their 
jurisdiction, whereas states' secondary or second-order duties to abide by 
those primary duties are duties they owe to all other states ~s well (qua 
(subset of or entire) international community).39 A second caveat is in 
order: the coexistence of different subjects of authority implies different 
authoritative reasons and this is in line with the piecemeal account oflegit-
imate authority presented before. Although all subjects of authority are 
discussed here, scope precludes discussing the specific justifications of 
authority for each of them later on in the chapter, and I shall focus mostly 
on states and individuals hereafter. 
37 Besson (2009a). I owe this expression to Murphy (2010). 
38 See Murphy (2010). See also, albeit in the domestic context, Raz (1986: 72). 
39 See O'Neill (2005: 433) on international human rights and duties qua second -order duties. 
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4.1.1 Authority by whom 
States are the original law-makers in international law. This is at least 
the case for the main sources of international law such as treaty law/cus-
tomary law and general principles of international law. Traditionally, 
states are understood as being both the primary law-makers and the pri-
mary legal subjects in international law, and hence as making laws for 
themselves on a horizontal basis. This horizontal conception of inter-
national law-making fits the consensualist view of international law 
whose authority is allegedly based on state consent: states make laws like 
individuals enter into contracts and they are only bound by what they 
have acquiesced to. However, unlike individuals directly or indirectly 
involved in the domestic law-making context who act qua officials either 
as representatives or as citizens and not in their private capacity, this 
~pp:~ach sees the involvement of states in international law-making qua 
mdlVlduals rather than qua officials. 
Such an approach is deeply misleading on more than one count. First, 
and as Waldron rightly argues, states are not just makers of the inter-
national legal order as private individuals would be the makers of a web 
of contractual promises; they are also its officials (Waldron 2006: 23-25; 
2011). Except in the cases where lOs' institutions are involved in inter-
national law-making, international law has few institutional resources of 
its own. It depends on states for the making, but also for the enforcement of 
its provisions. Governments are the officials or officers of the international 
legal system. Second, although states are free, rational agents, they are not 
themselves human individuals and cannot therefore act as those would. 
In the last resort, states are not the bearers of ultimate value. They exist 
for the sake of human individuals. In the international context, states are 
recognized by international law as trustees for the people committed to 
their care. Ultimately, international law is oriented to the well-being of 
human individuals, rather than to the freedom of states (Waldron 2011: 
23 ff.). This, of course, becomes clear from international human rights law, 
but it is also the point of most norms of international law. Finally, states 
cannot be viewed as independent law-makers separately from the indi-
viduals they ought to care for as officials and whom they bind indirectly 
when binding themselves. The fact that states no longer make laws only for 
themselves but also directly for other international subjects, such as lOs or 
individuals, is further evidence of their role as officials. Unless states are 
conceiv~d of as officials and as trustees in international law-making proc-
esses, th1s lack of congruence between international law-makers and legal 
subjects cannot be bridged. 
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This is particularly important in the human rights context where states . 
are binding themselves in order to bind their own authorities in domestic 
law in order to protect individual interests. In a democracy where there 
is an identity between the right-holders and the duty-bearers of human 
rights, this amounts to binding all individuals in favour of all individuals 
in any given state. It contributes to enhancing political equality, but it also 
implies tinkering with the relationship of interdependence between human 
rights and democracy as this reinforcement of political equality is done 
from outside the national polity and from outside domestic democracy. 
These considerations aboutthe role of states as internationallaw-makers 
have important normative consequences. First, states do not make inter-
national law just for themselves as free, rational agents, but as officials or 
representatives for their respective populations. Their role as officials con-
strains their competence not only in terms of internal accountability, but 
at the international level itself (Chayes 1965: 1410). States are bound by 
the rule of international law, i.e. the set of values and principles associated 
with the idea of international legality (Rawls 1971: 236-269; Raz 1979: 
212-219; Waldron 2006: 15). Second, when acting as officials, whether 
in the law-making or law-enforcement process, states have to coordinate 
among themselves, the way officials in a democratic state would (Waldron 
2003). However, this kind of coordination among officials differs from 
what applies in the domestic context. States act as law-making officials, but " 
also, as will be shown, as proxy-subjects. As a result, both the coordination 
among officials and that between subjects are often merged and cannot 
easily be dissociated. 
A ready objection is the lack oflegal security this would imply in inter-
national relations. If states can only act as official authorities in international 
law-making when they are democratic and represent their citizens, this 
drastically reduces the number of states which can produce binding inter-
nationallaws.40 Another objection in the human rights context would be 
that non -democratic states would have no means of contributing to the 
development of international human rights law from the outside and bind 
themselves internally on the basis of international human rights norms. 
Here again it is important to remember the interdependent relationship 
between human rights and political equality, and the counterproductive 
idea of committing to one without the other. 
40 See Christiano (2010) for a discussion of the representativity objection and potential 
remedies. 
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4.1.2 Authorityoverwhom 
States are the primary subjects ofbinding international norms. Most duties 
stemming from international legal norms directly constrain the action of 
states. Following the analogy between states and individuals entering pri-
vate contracts discussed before, states are generally held as being able to 
bind themselves as free, rational agents. 
This approach is misleading in this context as well, however. The ser-
vice conception of authority adopted in this chapter contends that author-
ity can only be justified if it facilitates its subjects' conformity with the 
(objective) reasons that already apply to them and hence respects their 
autonomy. Its application therefore has a prerequisite: the subject bound 
by a legal norm needs to be an autonomous subject, as it is only so that its 
freedom to choose from a range of options can be furthered by an authori-
tative directive. 
The analogy between authority for states and individuals presupposes 
therefore that the value of autonomy extends to the choices and actions of 
states. At first sight, it seems plausible that it does, given the value of shared 
membership in a national political community and, as a result, of the col-
lective self-determination of such communities (Christiano 2010). The 
problem is that the value of state autonomy can only be explained in terms 
?f t?~ autonomy of the individuals constituting it. States are quite unlike 
mdlVlduals when it comes to the value of their autonomy. Their auton-
?my cann?t simply be equated with that of any of their domestic legal sub-
Jects, but 1s the product of those subjects' autonomy as a political entity 
(Waldron 2006: 21). As a result, states can only be bound by international 
legal norms when they represent those subjects as officials and hence can 
bind them as proxy subjects to international law. When a state is morally 
bo~nd by a norm of international law, the duties imposed on it will require 
actwn that burdens individuals either indirectly, through international 
state action that is costly to national resources, or directly through the 
duty to enact domestic laws in order to transpose internationallaw into 
domestic law (or implement the latter directly in the domestic sphere). 
This affects individuals' balance of reasons as a result and explains why 
the autonomy of states and its ability to be bound depends on its constitu-
ency's autonomy and hence on its ability to represent the latter. 41 
. ~is is particularly important in the human rights context where by 
bmdmg themselves, states bind all their authorities and hence all their 
legal subjects mutually, and hence bind them to an even greater extent 
41 See also the discussion in Crawford & Watkins (2010: 283-298); and in Murphy (2010). 
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than in other fields of international law. The fact that it is done with other 
states, and from outside the democratic polity, makes it even more import-
ant that all individuals are adequately represented. 
Of course, states remain free, rational (albeit artificial) agents and as 
such they can enter into binding agreements the way an individual would 
enter into a contract. This can be the case for many contract-like treaties 
and other international agreements, although consent does not necessar-
ily bind in all cases (Raz 1986: 87-88). The opposite view would simply 
strip states of their right to bind themselves and hence from any of the 
meaningful implications of their quality as primary international legal 
subjects.42 Further, states' international legal obligations to obey would 
remain in place even if they are illegitimate, as they are often backed up by 
legal sanctions. And so would states' moral obligations to abide by morally 
correct directives which bind individuals (and states for them collectively) 
in any case. But populations unrepresented by those states woqld not be 
morally bound by those legal directives qua law. Nor could those states be 
bound in that way as a result. 
Of course, this constitutes a risk and it could eventually weaken some 
states' credentials at the international level and hence the po~sibility for 
them to bind themselves even only as subjects. At the same time, however, 
it could also provide an important incentive to democratize states from 
within, thus eventually leading to an increase in the overall legitimacy of 
international law itself. This is particularly important in the case of human 
rights where benefiting from human rights without being able to take part 
in national and hence international decision-making is, not only highly 
unlikely, but profoundly counterproductive. Human rights can only be 
truly respected in practice qua legal human rights if those they protect are 
self-governing and contributing to the identification of their equal rights. 
One way around this difficulty may be to consider international human 
rights treaties as contract-like treaties generating second-order inter-
state duties that only bind states the way promises would and to condi-
tion the possibility for those second -order duties to give rise to first -order 
state duties towards their individual members within domestic law in 
respect of the democratic requirements of representativity mentioned 
before. This distinction between second-order and first-order human 
rights duties would actually explain the greater authority in practice of 
international human rights agreements in democratic states than in non-
democratic ones. '< 
42 See Buchanan (2008: ?3) on the 'Vanishing Subject Matter Problem. 
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4.2 The justifications: piecemeal authority 
4.2.1 Coordinating authority 
The next question one ought to address in any account of legal authority 
pertains to the justification of authority, and more precisely to how indi-
vidual autonomy can be said to be enhanced by a given authority. The vir-
tue of the service conception of authority used in this chapter is that it does 
not rely on the existence of a general duty to obey international human 
rights law; their legitimate authority can be piecemeal depending on the 
states and their reasons, on the one hand, and the international human 
rights norms at stake, their sources and their qualities, on the other. 
First of all, and by virtue of the dependence condition, the reasons given 
by international law need to match the state's pre-existing reasons. If the 
state's duty to comply with an international legal norm implies a duty to 
abide by a duty, and e.g. a duty to abide by a human rights duty, then that 
state must have a matching pre-existing reason for action. 
In the case of human rights, the justification of authority implies 
increasing the state's conformity with its own reasons to protect funda-
mental and universal human interests. In view of the diversity of those 
reasons between states, the legitimate authority of international human 
rights can be regarded as piecemeal. Given what was said before about the 
moral-political nature of human rights and their relationship to political 
equality, the legitimate authority of international human rights only makes 
sense if the state has human rights-based moral duties and therefore if it is 
democratically organized and guarantees human rights domestically (pol-
itically or legally). The justified authority of human rights corresponds to 
the justification of the correlative duties. As a result, human rights and 
their corresponding duties can only arise in a given political context where 
interests can be compared and balanced against each other and recognized 
as equally important and vulnerable. The legitimate authority of inter-
national human rights is therefore a function of that of the correspond-
ing domestic human rights. The mutual legalization of international and 
domestic human rights law described in the previous section is reflected in 
their mutual legitimation and vice versa. 
In a non-democratic state, by contrast, there would be at the most rea-
sons to protect fundamental moral interests qua human rights and those 
reasons would be the only ones that could be matched by the reasons given 
by international human rights law. In those circumstances, international 
human rights would provide second-order reasons to adopt domestic 
human rights law rather than first-order reasons to comply with human 
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rights directly. In other words, the universal right to haver rights would 
be the only international legal human right and corresponding duty that 
would meet a state's pre-existing moral duty, i.e. the duty to bear human 
rights duties. Importantly, that minimal content of international human 
rights and their inclusive and consensual development bottom-up helps 
placate an important critique, i.e. that of parochialism that targets the DC 
and the correspondence between the second-order reasons to generate· 
first-order human rights duties and the states' existing reasons. 
Second, and by virtue of the normal justification condition, the con-
tent -independent reasons that are given by international law ought to help 
the state better conform to its own reasons, and individuals within states 
to theirs. There are many different justifications that may be given in this 
context. Not only is democratic coordination the best justification in the 
proposed revised service conception of authority, but it is actually one of 
the best justifications of the authority of international law. And this also 
pertains in the context of international human rights law. 
First of all, the horizontal nature of most relationships between subjects 
of international law makes justifications of authority based on a vertical 
ruling relationship between an authority and governed subjects less prob-
able. The legitimacy of major international law-making processes, such 
as customary law-making, multilateral treaty.!making or international 
institutionallaw-making, is therefore well accounted for by a coordinative 
justification of the authority of international law. Second, the lack of cen-
tralized and hierarchical law-making processes in international law con-
firms the need for various levels of coordination within the same regime, 
but also across regimes. Coordination can ensure coherence between sets 
of norms and across regimes, without hierarchy (Besson 2005b: 192-195; 
Waldron 1999). It can also account for the existence ofa public author-
ity and multilateral and multi-level law-making community despite the 
absence of a centralized law-making process and institution.43 This dis-
tinction is made difficult in the international context given the dispersed 
nature of public authority. Coordination provides that very distinctive fea-
ture and justification. Furthermore, states are a small group in number 
and are as a result easy to coordinate over issues of common concern such 
as human rights. 
Third, the coordination-based justification of authority fits the need 
for international regulation on difficult matters of common concern 
among subjects whose diversity of views creates pervasive and persistent 
43 See Waldron's (2003) critique ofRaz's account oflegal authority at the domestic level. 
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reasonable disagreements. This applies in cases of classic coordination 
problems such as: problems related to epidemic diseases, economic 
instability, environmental degradation, the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, migration movements that cannot be addressed by indi-
vidual states acting alone but only through coordination. It also applies, 
however, to conflict and partial conflict coordination cases where there 
is disagreement about issues of justice and common concern. On such 
issues, it is better that all coordinate over the same set of international 
norms rather than acting individually (even correctly) according to their 
own reasons. In a legal system characterized by deep divergence in eth-
ical, religious and political beliefs and practices, democratic coordination 
provides one of the best justifications of authority to escape irreducible 
substantive controversies. 
This third argument applies particularly well to international human 
rights. In circumstances of moral and social pluralism, where values are 
diverse and conflict with each other, and where their ranking can vary from 
one culture to the other, the fundamental interests protected by human 
rights are bound to conflict or at least vary and states to disagree reason-
ably over them. Based on their universal moral duty to protect human 
rights and the corresponding universal moral right to have human rights, 
states ought to coordinate on minimal interstate second-order duties to 
generate and protect full-blown first-order human rights duties in domes-
tic law. External and minimal human rights protection can help them to 
avoid a levelling-down in domestic protection. This can only be done, 
however, if those minimal human rights guarantees are identified bottom-
up on the basis of states' human rights practices. The coordinated minimal 
content of international second -order duties to adopt domestic first -order 
human rights duties can then evolve with the further development of 
domestic first-order human rights duties. Of course, for that to happen, 
further coordination ought to take place at the domestic level when identi-
fying and specifying the state's first-order human rights duties in domestic 
law. The need to coordinate on one set of minimal external human rights 
duties that protect a right to have human rights in the domestic context 
explains how the NJC can be saved from the exceptionalist critique that 
claims that some states may have reasons corresponding to the ones given 
by international human rights law (DC) but can respect them better on 
their own. 
Besides coordination, other justifications for the authority of inter-
national legal norms may also be mentioned. This is the case of the vol-
itional, decisive and cognitive abilities of certain norms of international 
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law.44 In most cases, however, as in the domestic context, the coordin-
ation justification of authority encompasses a lot of those other justifying 
grounds and it constitutes the most important justification of international 
law's authority. As a matter of fact, coordination captures precisely those 
other grounds that compensate for the predominant circumstances of epi-
stemic limitations. This is likely to be even more pertinent in international 
law given the diversity of the objects of international law, of its subjects 
and of their relationships. 
4.2.2 Democratic authority 
As in the domestic context, the coordination-based justification of inter-
national law's authority is enhanced in circumstances of disagreement 
about justice if the coordination procedure and functioning is demo-
cratic (Buchanan 2008). This is particularly the case with coordination 
over international human rights given the interdependent relationship 
between human rights and political equality, and the legitimizing role 
of human rights in domestic democracy. Due to the interdependence 
between human rights and political equality, the democratic requirements 
on international law-making process are actually higher when the legit-
imacy of human rights norms is at stake than for other international law 
norms. 
What democracy means in the international law-making context is a 
difficult issue and scope precludes fully addressing it here.45 In a nutshell, 
and as I have explained elsewhere, global democracy does not equate either 
with indirect state democracy nor with a state-like global democracy at the 
international level (Besson 2009c: 213 ff.). On the contrary, it groups all 
democratic processes that occur within and beyond the state and whose 
outcomes affect individuals within that state, but in ways that link national 
democracies among themselves and to other transnational, international 
or supranational democratic processes (Besson 2006, 2009d); 
Importantly, global democracy on that model can only strive if states 
are democratized from within at the same time; this is actually a key fea-
ture of the legitimate authority of international law for states, as discussed 
before. Indirect state democracy does not replace direct individual par-
ticipation or representation in international processes, however, at least 
from the perspective of the authority of international law over individuals. 
44 See Waldron (2003) for a detailed discussion of those justifications in the context of inter-
nationallaw. 
45 See, for an excellent discussion, Christiano (2010). 
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There are many reasons for this. To start with, their interests might diverge 
from those of their national polity, because they are members of a minor-
ity at the national level (Besson 2009c: 216; McCorquodale 2006). In fact, 
even in a democratic state, the international or external interests of that 
state might actually differ from those of the sum or the majority of that 
state's citizens, given the primary and increasing role of the executive in 
foreign policy and international negotiations. Furthermore, even when 
individual interests match their government's, the rule of international 
democracy, and in particular majoritarian rule in multilateral law-making 
(but also veto rights in the case of unanimous voting), cannot always guar-
antee international results that are in line with individual national will, or 
at least respect the principle of political equality in terms of the propor-
tionality of votes to the size of the populations represented. Thus, indirect 
international democracy models face the famous dilemma between states 
defending their citizens' interests at the expense of other states and their 
citizens on the one hand, and following the rules of international democ-
racy at the expense of their own citizens' interests, on the other ( Archibugi 
1993). Moreover, not all individuals subjected to international law are citi-
zens of democratic states, and hence have a say in national democratic 
processes pertaining to international issues, or are represented by demo-
cratically elected representatives in international fora. This creates an 
inequality in legitimacy (Christiano 2010 ). 
It is clear, however, that in current conditions of international law-
making, the equal inclusion of all those subjected and the means to get an 
equal say even in an iteratively democratic process are simply not guar-
anteed yet.46 One of the main shortcomings of international law-making 
processes at this time is the lack of respect for political equality and as a 
result for human rights themselves. It would be even more paradoxical, 
indeed, than at the domestic level to be enacting guarantees of international 
human rights and not to enable the beneficiaries of those rights to exercise 
them when deciding about those very rights and about their membership 
in the community of right -holders. At the same time, however, democratic 
coordination between states requires minimal guarantees of human rights 
to function properly and these should therefore be respected within inter-
national law-making processes themselves (Besson 2005b: 319-323). 
Of course, this difficulty raises the same issues of apparent circularity 
one meets when contemplating the democratic legitimacy ofhuman rights 
46 See Christiano (2010) on the democratic shortcomings ofboth his fair association of states 
model and his global democracy model. 
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at the domestic level and the role ofhuman rights in that very legitimation. 
In those circumstances, it would certainly be vain to look for an alternative 
foundation for the legitimacy of international law in international human 
rights law, as some authors have suggested (Goodin 2007; Teson 1998, 
2005). Rather, international law-making should be organized so as to both 
provide the enacting of human rights with deliberative and inclusive legit-
imacy and bolster that deliberative process by protecting minimal human 
rightsY This is a consequence of the mutual relationship between democ-
racy and human rights that lies in their respective grounding by reference 
to political equality. 
As a matter of fact, this legitimacy bootstrapping between human 
rights and democracy does not only occur at the international level itself 
and is actually less likely to occur at the international level than domes-
tically. This is mainly due to the underdeveloped democratic features of 
international law-making presented before. The legitimation of inter-
national human rights actually mostly involves the domestic level where 
international human rights and domestic democracy can be understood 
as standing in a mutually reinforcing relationship. International human 
rights become vernacularized or contextualized through domestic demo-
cratic law-making processes and that outcome can in return become a 
source of international human rights law. As I have argued elsewhere, this 
mutual legitimation between domestic and international human rights or, 
more exactly, between citizens' rights and human rights, is particularly 
important in the case of international human rights and their correspond-
ing domestic human rights: the recoupling between human rights and 
democracy that were decoupled in 1945 through the internationalization 
ofthe legal protection of human rights cannot operate horizontally (yet), 
but works vertically across legal orders and levels of governance (Besson 
2011c). 
As indicated in the previous section by reference to their legal sources, 
international human rights' guarantees are often abstra<:ted bottom-up 
from domestic guarantees as general principles and then constrain those 
domestic practices in return. As a result, the legalization of human rights 
is a two-way street that is not limited to a top-down reception or a bot-
tom-up crystallization, but is a retroactive process. An~ this corresponds 
to the way in which international human rights law is legitimized. Only 
those polities that respect international human· rights are legitimate in 
47 See Besson (2010); Buchanan (2008, 2010a). See also Cohen (2008) on the human right to 
have rights. 
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specifying the content of those rights qua citizens' rights and hence in con-
tributing to the recognition and existence of those rights qua international 
human rights that constrain polities in return and so on. This corresponds 
to what Allen Buchanan has referred to recently as 'reciprocal legitimacy'; 
it implies that international law may contribute to the legitimacy of corre-
sponding domestic legal norms and vice versa (Buchanan 2004: 187-189; 
Buchanan 2011; Besson 2013b, 2013c). 
4.3 Other reasons to comply: consent 
Like in the domestic context, it may of course happen that some inter-
national legal norms are not legitimate on any of the grounds just men-
tioned or, at least, not for all states at once. This even more so with 
democracy: even defined as it is in this chapter, it is still limited and largely 
incremental in the international context. This is particularly problematic 
when the international norms to legitimize are human rights norms given 
the interdependence between human rights and political equality; the 
democratic requirements on international law-making process are higher 
when the democratic legitimacy of human rights norms is at stake than 
otherwise. 
Of course, and although democracy is particularly relevant, other justifi-
cations for their authority may still be available (Besson 2009a). Moreover, 
it is important to emphasize that this conclusion does not affect the legal 
validity and as a result the legal authority of human rights norms under 
current international law. Nor does it impact the moral reasons there may 
be for states to adopt or recognize international legal guarantees of a given 
human right in the first place, whether those reasons are self-regarding or 
cosmopolitan (Buchanan & Powell2008: 330 ff.). There may be other rea-
sons than ones oflegitimacy for states to actually respect and comply with 
international human rights, some instrumental (e.g. democratic peace) 
and other justice- or fairness-related. While those reasons are no justifica-
tions for the authority of a legal human right, they are reasons for compli-
ance that coexist and are important in international law. 
So, the hiatus between the general scope of the claim to legitimacy laid 
by international human rights law and the effective scope of its iegitimacy 
in practice is likely to be more significant than in the domestic context, 
in the absence of a single centralized set of law-making institutions and 
processes. This need not be a source of concern, however, in view of the 
widespread de facto authority of international human rights law and of the 
coexistence of other reasons to respect international law (and not to obey 
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it) (Raz 1986:88 ff.; 1995: 80-94; 2006: 1028-1029). These reasons might, 
as a matter of fact, explain how international law's claim to general legit-
imacy may seem entirely granted in practice, although international law 
does not and canQot have general legitimate authority over all its subjects 
at any given time. 
One of the complementary reasons for respect of international law is 
consent. Interestingly, consent theory is the dominant account of legitim-
acy among international lawyers and this is traditionally captured by the 
general principle of international law pacta sunt servanda. The popularity 
of consent in accounts of the legitimacy of international law may partly be 
explained by the widespread failure to distinguish between the normative 
and sociological senses oflegitimacy: at least on the basis of an individual 
analogy, there seems to be some empirical connection between believing 
a norm is binding and having previously consented to it (Raz 1995: 360 ff.; 
2006: 103 7 ff.; Tasioulas 20 lOa). In normative terms, however, consent fails 
to provide independent authoritative reasons to obey the law (Hart 1994: 
224 ff.; Raz 1995: 355-369). Scope precludes rehearsing the many short-
comings of the consent-based justification of political authority,48 whether ~ 
consent is thought of as express or tacit, and as actual or hypothetical. 
Following Raz, therefore, one may argue that consent to a legal authority 
is effective as a source of obligations only if the authority respects autonomy 
and hence satisfies an independent test oflegitimacy.49 Of course, consent 
can still have some impact on legitimacy; it can strengthen obligations to 
obey and can express a citizen's trust in their public authorities (Raz 1986: 
90; 1995: 368-369). However, consent cannot generate legitimacy. / 
In international law, there are further specific reasons why (demo-
cratic)50 state consent is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition o( 
legitimacy (Buchanan 2004: 301-304; Buchanan 2008). Despite similar 
or even greater limitations of consent qua source of legitimate authority 
to those applying in the domestic context, consent is paradoxically even 
more important as a source of recognition and respect of the authority of 
international law than in the domestic context. 51 This has to do with the 
fragmentation of international law and institutions and the absence of a 
centralized legal order and of central political institutions. In the current 
48 For a general discussion of the shortcomings of the consent -based justification of political 
authority, see Sirilmons (1979). 
49 See Raz (1986: 89; 1995: 355-369). See the discussion in Hershovitz (2003: 201, 215). 
50 On the limitations of democratic state consent, see Besson (2009c: 214-217); Buchanan 
(2004). 
51 See Lefkowitz (2005) for a similar argument; Christiano (2012). 
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and non-ideal circumstances of international law-making, the equality of 
states qua referential political entities through which self-determination 
can be exercised is particularly important and that equality expresses itself 
through state consent. Moreover, since individual political equality is not 
yet fully secured in current international law-making processes and in 
view of their inherent democratic limitations, the equality of states and 
the state consent of democratic states are the best approximation that may 
often be secured (Christiano 2010, 2012). 
To start with, due to the plurality of subjects involved in international 
law-making and their manifold roles, as is particularly dear from the 
role of states qua subjects and officials, consent can clarify the existence 
of justifications for the authority of international law for specific sub-
jects. Furthermore, consent can often be used as a normative strength-
ener when states consent to abide by duties of justice52 or to authoritative 
international legal norms. This is particularly important in international 
law, as consent can ease coordination by clarifying participants' intentions 
to coordinate and their trust in public authority, and hence can further 
legitimize authority. Finally, the pre-eminence in traditional international 
law, but also in certain areas of international law today, of contract-like 
promises between states, and the difficulty in distinguishing obligations 
stemming from those promises from obligations to obey the law qua law, 
explains how consent could usually account for widespread cases of de 
facto authority of international law. For instance, qua rational collective 
agents, states can bind themselves legally through consent and promises 
under certain conditions (Raz 1986: 87-88), even when they cannot be 
deemed authoritatively and morally bound by those obligations because 
they do not act as officials for their constituency. And even if they do act as 
officials for their constituency, it is difficult in practice to distinguish cases 
of legitimate authority from cases where they are bound through mutual 
promises. 
Of course, there are conditions to be respected before consent can be 
deemed to strengthen or even extend independent authoritative reasons -
conditions which may themselves overlap with justifications of authority 
itself (Lefkowitz 2005). First, consent cannot be used to bind oneself to 
immoral acts. Second, state consent ought to be free and unconstrained, 
on the one hand, and duly informed, on the other. 53 
52 Estlund (2008: 127) on normative consent. 
53 See Christiano (2012) on the conditions offair state consent. 
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In the human rights context, states may consent to international human 
rights norms that do not bind them legitimately. Their consent cannot 
make up for the lack of legitimate authority of those norms, but it can 
reinforce those rights' sociological legitimacy or confirm other reasons a 
state may have to comply with those rights, and in particular self-regarding 
or even other-regarding justice-based reasons (Simmons 2009). Moreover, 
in cases described before where the existence of second-order interstate 
human rights duties of non -democratic states cannot be justified except by 
reference to contract-like promises, consent does play an important role. 
5. The exceptions: sovereignty 
One of the main challenges to the legitimacy of international law is that it 
allegedly fails to respect the autonomy of states, intruding upon domains 
in which they should be free to make their own decisions. State sover-
eignty is often understood in international law as a competence, immunity 
or power, and in particular as the power to make autonomous' choices (so-
called sovereign autonomy). The legitimate authority of international law 
is as a result often opposed to state sovereignty. 
Based on the service conception of authority discussed before, author-
ity can only be justified if it facilitates its subjects' conformity with the 
(objective) reasons that already apply to them and hence if it respects 
their autonomy. There is per se no conflict between justified authority and 
autonomy. Regarding some matters, however, it is more important that a 
person reaches and acts on his or her own decision, rather than take a puta-
tive authority's directives as binding, even if doing the latter would result 
in decisions that, in other respects, better conform to reason (Raz 1995: 
365-366; 2006: 10 14). This is what Raz has referred to as the independence 
condition (Raz 2006). It is difficult, however, to distinguish those cases 
from cases where legitimate authority can apply, the incompatibility being 
at the most contingent and relative to certain circumstances (Tasioulas 
2010a).54 
The contingency of the independence condition is even more dearly "~ 
the case in international law. If states are deemed as officials both qua 
law-makers and qua proxy-subjects of authority in the international legal 
order, their autonomy cannot simply be equated with that of any of their 
domestic legal subjects. It is the product of those subjects' autonomy as a 
political entity and the value of that autonomy itself depends on that of the 
54 Tasioulas (2010a). See, however, the discussion in Raz (2006: 1015 ff.). 
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individuals of which it is constituted. Considered in both its internal and 
external dimensions, a state's sovereign autonomy is a purely legal con-
struct, as a result, and not something whose value is to be assumed as a first 
principle of normative analysis. In its internal dimension, the state works as 
a legal organization- it is the outcome of organizing certain rules of public 
life in a particular way (Waldron 2006: 21-22).Its sovereignty is artificial 
and it is legally constructed for the benefit of those whose internal interests 
it protects. In its external dimension, the sovereignty and the sovereign 
autonomy of the individual state are equally artefacts of international law 
(Murphy 2010). There can be no international legal order without sov-
ereign states, but equally there can be no sovereign states without inter-
national law (Endicott 2010; Hart 1994: 223). What a state's sovereignty is 
and what it amounts to is not given as a matter of the intrinsic value of its 
individuality, but determined by the rules of the international legal order. 
Those rules define state sovereignty so as to protect the internal and exter-
nal interests of the political community qua sovereign equal to others, but , 
also to protect the interests of other subjects of international law. 
If this is correct, the potential cases of incompatibility between the ser-
vice authority and state freedom are likely to be even more contingent in 
the international legal order than in the domestic context. The only possible 
incompatibility under the independence condition therefore would be that 
between service authority, on the one hand, and the individual autonomy 
of a state's subjects and their collective autonomy qua democratic polity as 
they are represented by those states at the international level, on the other. 
As a result, provided states act qua officials and proxy-subjects when mak-
ing international law and the other conditions of the democratic authority 
of international law discussed before to protect individual subjects' au ton-
amy are fulfilled, state sovereignty seems to be necessarily compatible with 
justified international legal authority. 
True, sovereign states are collective entities and as such their relation-
ships are likely to be even more riddled with disagreement than individ-
uals: Moreover, one of the values of sovereignty being self-determination, 
it is clear that decisional independence is of value in the case of sovereign 
states as well. Finally, given the circumstances of social and cultural plur-
alism that prevail globally, it is likely that state autonomy can be exercised 
valuably in very different manners. All this makes self-determination over 
certain matters just as important to sovereign states as it is to individuals, 
albeit for different reasons. This is clearly the case when deciding over con-
stitutive standards in a democracy such as human rights and democracy 
itself 
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In sum, state sovereignty is not necessarily compatible with the author-
ity of international law. It is only the case when the latter has legitim-
ate authority, i.e. furthers state autonomy and the reasons that underlie 
state autonomy. Those can be understood by reference to the values 
that make a good state or more generally a good political entity such as 
self-determination, democracy and human rights, but also the values 
that make a good international community of equal sovereign entities. 
However, this should not be taken to mean that state sovereignty is only 
incompatible with international law's authority when the latter is illegit-
imate. There may be cases where autonomy requires legitimate authority, 
but others where self-direction is valuable despite the prima facie justifi-
cation of international law's authority. Too much international regulation 
would empty sovereign autonomy from its purpose (Endicott 2010). In 
short, it would be wrong to explain sovereignty only by reference to the 
legitimacy of international law, but also, conversely, to account for the 
legitimacy of international law only by reference to sovereignty. It is with 
respect to the values they both serve that the authority of international 
law can be justified in some cases, together with the prima facie restric-
tions to state autonomy this implies. 
Of course, the absence of independent state autonomy distinct from 
that of the sum of its legal constituents does not mean that states cannot 
be deemed as collective agents and hence relate as free, rational agents. 
In that context, however, as discussed earlier, states do not act to pro-
mote their constituency's autonomy and cannot therefore be deemed as 
authoritatively bound by their actions in moral terms. But this does not 
preclude legal obligations, as well as moral reasons to abide by morally 
correct directives. Furthermore, as qiscussed before, complementary 
sources of non-authoritative reasons (or action such as consent or trust 
usefully complement those legal-du,ties. To that extent, their sovereignty 
may have to be protected, but not against the legitimate authority of inter-
nationallaw. 
What the relationship between international legal authority and state 
sovereignty means in the human rights context is primarily that the trad-
itional prima facie opposition between state sovereignty and human 
rights is a false one (Besson 2012c). State sovereignty cannot be dissoci-
ated from the protection of the political equality and human rights of the 
individuals constituting that state, and cannot be invoked against them 
as a result. 
Of course, this is not to say that state sovereignty cannot be in tension 
with international human rights law. Importantly, international sovereignty 
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protects a collective entity of individuals - a people - and not individual 
human beings per se. True, their fates are connected, the way democracy 
and human rights are correlated. But sovereignty, and sovereign equality 
in particular, protects democratic autonomy in a state's external affairs and 
remains justified for this separately from international human rights. Thus, 
the tensions between international human rights and state sovereignty are 
reminiscent of those between popular sovereignty and human rights in 
the domestic context. The difference is that one of them is international 
while the other remains domestic. 
In short, state sovereignty cannot be dissociated from the protection 
of the political equality and human rights of the individuals constituting 
that state, and cannot per se be regarded as incompatible with the values 
it is meant to help pursue. However, given the value of both individual 
and collective autonomy in the human rights context and their potential 
contradictions, two different consequences follow depending on"the kind 
of international human rights norms at stake. 
First of all, sovereignty cannot be invoked to escape the legitimate 
authority of the universal moral right to have rights at domestic level. 
Sovereignty can only protect political autonomy when it exists in a norma~ 
tive sense; it cannot therefore be opposed to the legitimate authority of the 
right to have rights. In such a case, self-determination is undermined and 
sovereignty forfeited. Second, this also means, however, that, with respect 
to international human rights more generally, states may not commit to 
and abide by more than their constituency could and what that right to 
have rights or self-government authorizes. When the legal norms at stake 
pertain to the basic rules of political legitimacy at domestic level and 
the details of human rights protection, both state sovereignty and inter-
national human rights law have met their intrinsic limitations. Deciding 
on what makes us members of a political community and how to protect 
our equal rights as such is the least likely issue to leave the scope of collect-
ive self-government and hence of sovereignty. 
This in turn explains why international human rights norms are usually 
minimal, abstract and indeterminate so as to grant states a lot of auton-
omy in their specification and implementation. Even when minimal inter-
national human rights duties are fleshed out on the basis of states' practice, 
a given state may still invoke its margin of appreciation or, the principle of 
the maximization of protection in controversial cases despite the prima 
facie legitimate authority of those human rights duties. This confirms that 
(the limits of) domestic legitimate authority ought not necessarily be con-
flated with (the limits of) national sovereignty. 
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6. Conclusion 
International human rights may be facing grave enforcement problems 
and even specification problems, but their most important problem, I have 
argued, is legitimacy. Focusing on the former before addressing the latter 
is putting the cart before the horse and risks looking for solutions to failing 
enforcement and deep indeterminacy where they cannot be found. Nor 
is the problem of the legitimacy of international human rights si:mply a 
matter of settling the conflict between their claim to legitimacy and that 
of domestic human rights law. Settling that question is important, but it 
requires understanding of how international human rights' authority is 
justified in the first place and this implies understanding their comple-
mentarity to domestic human rights. 
International human rights cannot be fully grasped without referring 
to their corresponding duties and this requires taking the noqnative side 
of human rights more seriously. This is even more important if what is 
at stake is their legitimacy. To know whether international human rights 
norms have a justified claim to authority over states, one needs to start by 
assessing what kind of duties and hence what kind of re.!!JOns for action 
states have by virtue of recognizing human rights. ':Qlis implies determin-
ing whether those norms can be described as legal human rights in the 
first place with the respective moral duties they imply." Then only can one 
turn to the different conditions of their legitimate authority and of how the 
reasons given by international law not only match corresponding states' 
reasons but also contribute to improving conformity to those reasons. By 
virtue of their correlative duties, human rights are such that their legal 
validity and legitimacy are more closely related than they are in the case of 
other legal norms. 
More specifically and given their close relationship to political equal-
ity, I have argued that human rights are moral and legal in nature. Their 
legalization ought to take place at domestic level in priority and inter-
national human rights norms can only be regarded as human rights if 
they match an existing set of domestic human rights. International human 
rights are best understood, therefore, as international law second-order 
duties to adopt and abide by first-order human rights duties in domestic 
law. Those second -order duties correspond to the universal moral right to 
have rights, i.e. the right to political membership with all the human rights 
that right requires for its realization. In turn, the moral and legal reality of 
human rights affects their legitimacy: not all states can be bound to respect 
all human rights duties for lack of pre-existing reasons in the absence of 
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first-order domestic human rights duties or democratic representation; 
while democratic coordination is the best justification one may give for 
the legitimacy of international human rights in circumstances of pervasive 
social and moral pluralism, it is not necessarily sufficiently democratic to 
justify the authority of rights that are central to democratic legitimation at 
the domestic level; finally, even though the value of state sovereignty and 
autonomy is defined by reference to human rights, sovereignty can con-
stitute an exception to the legitimate authority of human rights when the 
boundaries of self-government are met. 
Unsurprisingly, as a result, international human rights' legitimate 
authority, like that of other international law norms, is piecemeal: it varies 
from one state to the other, and from one human right source or norm to 
the other. In fact, the legitimate authority of international human rights is 
doubly piecemeal by virtue of the indeterminate nature of human rights 
and the dynamic and specifiable nature of their corresponding duties: 
states' duties to create human rights duties will also vary as a result by ref-
erence to the latter. Those state to state and right to right variations are 
even higher in the case of human rights than for other international legal 
norms which have no functional domestic equivalent or corresponding 
norms: given their reciprocal legal sources in domestic and international 
law, the legitimacy of international human rights and that of correspond-
ing domestic human rights are closely related and somehow reciprocal. 
If the forum of realization of moral-political rights and as a consequence 
the locus of human rights legalization are situated at the domestic level, 
this is also where the legitimation of international human rights ought 
to be sought for and promoted. Recurrent and seemingly banal human 
rights practices such as the domestic reception and specification of inter-
nation'al human rights, the exhaustion of domestic remedies as a condi-
tion of admission before international human rights bodies, the margin 
of appreciation in the interpretation of international human rights or the 
domestic determination of the best means of enforcement of international 
human rights decisions seem therefore to have found their moral justifi-
cation. There is nothing vacuous or, worse, politically worrying as a result 
in international human rights minimalism and their piecemeal authority. 
Quite the contrary: it corresponds not only to the legality of international 
human rights, but also to their moral reality. 
Importantly, those conclusions about the legitimacy of international 
human rights should not be mistaken with a denial of the existence of 
other self-regarding or cosmopolitan reasons for states to ratify and respect 
international human rights law. Those reasons are actually very important 
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and may help enhance the sociological legitimacy of international human 
rights law and compliance with those rights. So should democratic states' 
consent that constitutes an important reason for them to respect inter-
national human rights law even if it cannot palliate the absence oflegitim-
ate authority of those norms. After all, those international human rights 
norms are valid legal duties, whose validity and legal authority remain, at 
least in the short run, unaffected by the absence of generalized legitimate 
authority. Nor should one underestimate states' and individuals' imperfect 
duties of global justice; human rights do not exhaust the field of moral 
duties in international relations as one too often tends to forget. 
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